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A LECTURE 



ON THE 



SA'NKHYA PHILOSOPHY 



EMBRACING THE TEXT 



OF THE 



T A T T W A S A 31 A' S A 



PRINTED FOR THE USE OF THE BENARES COLLEGE 
BY ORDER OF GOVERNMENT N. W. P. 



ORPHAN SCHOOL PRESS :—SUPT. R. 0. MATHER. 

1850. 



•33^3313 
125b 



WEBER COLLECTmm* 



PREFACE 



This Lecture, delivered in the session of 1849, is a sequel to 
those on the Nydya Philosophy delivered to the senior class of 
pupils in the English Department of the Benares College, in 
1848, (C with the view of introducing them to the philosophical 
terminology current among their learned fellow-countrymen the 
pandits.' 

For selecting the Tattiva-samdsa as the text-book, there were 
two motives — the simplicity of its arrangement, and the extreme 
rarity of the work. Mr. Colebrooke (at p. 233. vol. 1st of his 
Essays) speaks of it as being uncertain whether the work were 
still extant ; and few of the pandits appear to know it except by 
name, 

J. R. B, 

Benares College,^ 

31s/ My, 1850. J 



SYNOPSIS OF THE CONTENTS. 

The twenty-five Principles — consisting of — 
No. 5. — The eic.iit producers : — 

Viz. No. G. — The Undiserete — 
„ No. 8.— Intellect— 
„ No. 17. — Self-consciousness — ■ 
„ No. 19.— The five Subtile Elements- 
No. 26. — The sixteen Productions : — 

Viz. No. 27- — The eleven Organs — 
„ No. 31.— The five Gross Elements- 
No. 34.— Soul. 



The operation of the Principles — consisting in 

No. 54. — Developemcnt — 

No. 55. — Reabsorption — 

No. 73. — Bondage — 

No. 74. — Liberation. 



The Sankhya theory of Evidence — involving 
No. 7G.— Perception — 
No. 77. — Inference — 
No. 78. — Testimony. 



A LECTURE 



ON THB 



SANKHYA PHILOSOPHY 



No. 1. — [The founder of the Sdnkhya school of philosophy was 
Kapila, Two treatises are attributed to him — the Sdnkhya-pra- 
vachana and the Tatwa-samdsa. The latter will form the text 
of the] following observations. The commentary commences 
thus : — ] 

No. 2. — Salutation to Ganesa ! Salutation to the great sage 
Kapila ! Salutation to that great sage Kapila who, at the first 
creation, obtained, merely by birth, a knowledge of the twenty- 
five principles (tatwa). 

Now we shall explain the aphorisms of the Sdnkhya, which con- 
stitute what is called the Compendium of Principles. 

[ In saying that Kapila obtained his knowledge " merely by 
birth/' the author means that Kapila differed from those other tea- 



2 A LECTURE ON THE 

chers who, after being born, received instruction before they were 
qualified to teach. Kapila is regarded as an incarnation of the 
deity.] 

No. 3. — A certain brahman, aggrieved by the three kinds of 
pain, had recourse to the great sage Kapila, the teacher of the 
Sdnkhya. Having declared his family, his name and race, and 
his desire of instruction, he said — " Holy Sir ! What is of all 
things the most important ? What is actual truth ? And what 
must I do in order that I may have done what is fitting to be 
done ?" Kapila replied — u I shall tell you." 

[ The Aphorisms of Kapila here follow.] 
*A« V^ STT^: 1VUI ^ SR^TffTFT: 1\^ II T^^^Tf%- 

^ i\8D ^sif^^nmcfw: iviii ^t^^tt ^f%; im^rsr- 

^g^Pnft *T?nra : R°u fafMt *rnrt^: \^\\\ f*Pr- 
vftfFW w*A f*fin?t*TO: «#l f^fr* *nntf i^8« 



SANKHYA PHILOSOPHY. 3 

No. 4. — M (1) The eight ' producers' (prakriti) ; (2) the six- 
" teen c productions' (vikdra) ; (3) ' Soul' (purusha); (4) the 
" c triad of qualities' (traigunya); (5) ' emanation' or ' develope- 
" ment' (sanchara); (6) ' re-absorption' or 'dissolution' (pratisan- 
" chara); (7) the ' ministers of Soul' (adhydtma) ; (8) the 'pro- 
H vince of an organ' (adhibhuta); (9) the respective ' presiding 
" deity' (adhidaivata) ; (10) the five ' perversities of understand- 
" ing" (abhibuddhi) ; (11) the five 'sources of action' (karmma- 
cc yoni); (12) the five ' airs' (vdyuj ; (13) the five ' which consist 
" of action' (karmmdtma) ; (14) 'ignorance' (avidyd) under five 
" divisions ; (15) 'disability' (as'akti) of twenty-eight kinds; (16) 
Ci ' acquiescence' or 'indifference' (tushti) of nine kinds; (17) 
" ' perfectness' (siddhi) of eight kinds; (18) the 'radical facts' 
" (mulikdrtha) of ten kinds ; (19) ' benevolent nature/ (anugra- 
(t ha-sarga) ; (20) ' created existences' (bhuta-sarga) of ten des- 
" criptions; (21) 'parental creation' (dhdtu-sansarga) of three dis- 
" criptions ; (22) three-fold ' bondage' (bandha) ; (23) three-fold 
"'liberation' (moksha) ; (24) three-fold 'proof (pramdna) ; (25) 
"three-fold 'pain' (du'kha): — in this consists all actual truth. 
" He who shall have thoroughly understood this, will have done 
" all that is to be done. He will not again be obnoxious to the 
" three sorts of pain." 

Such are the Aphorisms of the Sdnkhya, entitled the ' Com- 
pendium of Principles.' 

[ The commentator then proceeds to dilate on each of the fore- 
going topics.] 



4 A LECTURE ON THE 

No. 5. — Now which are those eight 'producers 5 ? To this it is 
replied — (1) the ' undiscrete' (avyaJcta) ; (2) e intellect' (buddhi); 
(3) ' self- consciousness' (ahankdra) ; and (4 — 8) the five ' subtile 
rudiments' (tan-mdtra) ; — these are the eight * producers.' 

[ Each of these eight 'producers' is now taken up in its order.} 

No. 6. — Now the ' undiscrete' is described. As, in this 
world, jars, webs, vases, and couches are made manifest, not so 
is the e undiscrete 5 : — that is to say — it is not apprehended by the 
hearing or by any other sense. Why ? Because it has neither begin- 
ning, middle, nor end ; nor is it made up of parts. The inaudible, 
intangible, invisible, indestructible, and likewise eternal, devoid 
of savour and odour, — without beginning or middle, anterior in or- 
der to mind, firm and chief — thus do the learned designate it. 
Subtile, devoid of characteristic attributes, unconscious, without 
beginning or end, — so too whose nature it is to produce, without 
parts, one only, the common [source of all] — such is the e undis- 
crete.' 



8ANKHYA PHILOSOPHY. 5 

No. 7- — Synonymes of the ' undiscrete' are the following — viz : 
the ' undistinguished,' ' unseparated/ or 'imperceptible' (avyak- 
ta); the 'chief (pradhdna); the 'source of emanation* (brahma): 
the 'receptacle' or 'abode/ (pura); the 'permanent' (dhruva) ; 
the 'chief/ or ' that in which all generated effect is comprehen- 
ded' (pradhdnaka) ; the ' indestructible' (akshara) ; the ' site' or 
'field' (kshetra); 'darkness' (ta?7ias); the ' productive source' (pra- 
suta). 

[Several of these terms are not, strictly speaking, synonymes, 
further than as they are all applicable to the ' undiscrete*. They 
are epithets employed for reasons which may appear in the sequel. 
A similar remark applies to the- various lists of synonymes which 
will be met with further on. 

We now come to the second of the eight ' producers' (No. 5) 
— viz 'intellect'.] 

*IV* TOT: I ?Srt^TR T ST*: I T^T *ff : I 

No. 8.— What is ' intellect' ? To this it is replied—' intellect' 
is 'ascertainment' (adhyavasdya). This it is from which, in re- 
gard to a cow or any other thing, there is the determination 
' This is so and so, and not otherwise' — ' This is a cow, not a 
horse' — c This is a post, not a man.' Such is 'intellect' or 'un- 
derstanding.' 

[The various aspects under which this faculty is regarded as 
presenting itself, are next specified.] 



O A LECTURE ON THE 

t^TTO %%t^ ^trifw ir^rf% wf ^T*f Vniqfrqrg f fir- 

frf I 

No. 9. — Of this e intellect' there are eight forms— (1) ' virtue' 
(dharma); (2) e knowledge' (jnydna) ; (3) l dispassion' (vairdgya); 
(4) superhuman c power' (aiswarya) — [the remaining four being 
the opposites or negatives of these. See No. 14.] 

Pre?: ^r^r^r^w: i 

No. 10. — f Virtue* {dharma) is the opposite of 'vice' (adharma) ; 
it is what is enjoined in the e scripture' (s'ruti) and in the ' law' 
(smriti) ; not opposed to the practice of the pious — of which the 
symptom is felicity [ — prosperity being regarded as the fruit of 
former virtue, and adversity as that of former vice.] 

No. 11, — ' Knowledge' (jnydna) is the opposite of ' ignorance' 
(ajnydna) — an acqaintance with the ' principles' ( tatwa ), the 
* forms' of intellect (bhdva~l$o, 9.), and the 'elements' (bhuta« 
No 31.) 

No. 12. — c Dispassion' (vairdgya) is the opposite of e passion' 
(avairdgya) : — it consists in not concerning one's self about 
sounds or any other c objects of sense' (vishaya). 

No. 13. — Superhuman F power' (aiswurya) is the opposite of 
6 powerlessness' (anaiswarya) ; it consists of the eight qualities/ 



SANKHYA PHILOSOPHY. / 

[the capacity of assuming a form of the utmost] ' minuteness' 
(animd) fyc. 

These four [kinds of ' intellect' — Nos. 10. — 13.] are [regarded 
as] e partak-ing of the quality of goodness' (sdtwika). [See No. 
50]. 

fr ^TTft I 

No. 14. — 'Vice' (adharma), c ignorance' (ajnydna), 'subjec- 
tion to passion' (avairdgyd), and ' powerlessness' (anaiswarya), 
[are next described]. 

' Vice' is the opposite of ' virtue' — opposed to Scripture and 
Law — opposed to the practice of the pious — and of which the 
symptom is adversity. [See No. 10] . 

* Ignorance' is the opposite of ' knowledge' — the reverse of an 
acquaintance with the e principles', the ' forms' of intellect, and 
the ' elements'. [See No. 11.] 

c Subjection to passion' is the opposite of ' dispassion' : — it con- 
sists in perseveringly concerning one's self about sounds and other 
objects of sense. 

* Powerlessness' is the opposite of superhuman ' power' : — it is 
the being destitute of [the capacity of] 'minuteness' &c. 

These four [kinds of 'intellect'] are [regarded as] f partaking 
of the quality of Darkness' (tdmasa). [See No. 52]. 






8 A LECTURE ON THE 

[What consequences severally appertain to the above-described 
modifications of c intellect/ is next stated.] 

t^T^w fSrf*nT i sraffrasr: i ^^f^r^5rrTrf?r 5 ffnTfw- 

No. 1 5. — Through ' virtue/ as a cause, there is c elevation in the 
scale of being* (urdhwa-gamana) ; through ' knowledge/ as a 
cause, there is e liberation' from existence (moksha) ; through 
' dispassion/ as a cause, there is * absorption into nature/ {prakri- 
ti-laya) ; through superhuman ' power/ as a cause, there is 
6 unimpeded movement' [even through solid rocks and the like], 
(iapratihata-gati) . 

Thus has ' intellect/ in its eight forms [No. 9] been described. 

No. 16. — The following words are synonymes — [See No. 7] — 
of ' intellect' — viz : c mind* (manas) ; ' understanding' (mati) ; 
the ' great' principle (mahat) ; the e Creator' (brahmd) ; ? familiar 
knowledge' (khydti) ; e wisdom' (prajnyd) ; * intelligence through 
report' (s^uti) ; ' resolution' (dhriti) ; a ( train of thought' (praj- 
nydna-santati) ; * memory' (smriti) ; and c meditation' (dhi) ; in 
such terms is f intellect' spoken of. 

[We now come to the third of the eight ' producers' (No. 5) — 
viz * self-consciousness' — that which is implied in a man's employ- 
ing the pronoun c I' — a pronoun the employment of which de- 
clares the speaker's belief that he possesses an individuality of 
his own.] 



SANKHYA PHILOSOPHY. 9 

^T SOTpnTR: I ^ ^r"^" ^ ^TO ^f ^ ^TT T^ I 

^ TR* ^ ^TT'Tt S^RfT^: I ^ ^Nft w w j5t- 
*nRt s^t wt 'frr: I *sp* ^n?T ^f%f*r: 
imT^T "3; ih" r^frTT: I 

No. 17. — To the question — what is 'self-consciousness'? — it 
is replied that e self-consciousness' is a e conceit' (abhimdna) — the 
conceit or fancy that ' I am the embracer in the case of sound' 
[i.e., <I hear'], 'I feel/ <l see,' < I taste,' <l am lord/ <I 
am rich/ * I am deity/ ' I enjoy/ e I am connected with virtue/ 
' by me was he slain/ C I shall be slain by powerful enemies :' — 
such and the like belief is ' self-consciousness/ 

[ The term ahankdra (the f making of an Ego or an I'J, the 
technical import of which, as remarked by Professor Wilson, is 
' the pride or conceit of individuality/* is rendered, in Mr. Cole- 
brooke's version of the Sdnkliya KdriJcd, by the term e Egotism.' 
It must be carefully borne in mind that the word ' egotism,' thus 
employed, is not to carry with it the familiar import of bustling 
vanity — the feeling which prompts a vain man to be constantly 
talking about himself: — for, a man who is no 'egotist,' in that 
familiar sense of the term, is not the less chargeable with ahan-kd- 
ra, if he fancies that his employing the pronoun e V at all is not an 
absurdity. The word, as described by Vdchaspati, in his com- 
mentary on the 24th of the Kdrikds of Fs'wara Krishna, might 
signify f egotism' in the ordinary sense — verging even on 'ego-ism/ 
— i.e., the belief that ' besides me there is nought else :' — but the 
significance of Kapila's system will perhaps be more clearly dis- 

* Sdnkhya Kdrikd—p. 91. 

B 



10 A LECTURE ON' THE 

cerned, if the technical acceptation of the term, as given by Pro- 
fessor Wilson, be strictly adhered to.] 

No. 18.— The various epithets given to ' self-consciousness' are 
6 the conceit of individuality' (ahan&dra); the e modifying 5 {vai- 
kdrika) ; the c ardent' (taijasa) ; the f. origin of the elements' 
(bhutddi) ; f dependent on inference' [sdnumdna ) ; and ' indepen- 
dent of inference' (niranumdna) . 

[ Of the eight ' producers' (No. 5) we have now to consider the 
last five — viz., the five ' subtile elements' — the rudiments of what 
are familiarly called the ' elements.'] 

^ cr^rrrfa i "s^rr^r^f ^rcrrsu^ ^ira^n^" tw- 

No. 19. — To the question — what are the five f subtile ele- 
ments' ? — it is replied : — the five 6 subtile elements' are conse- 
quents of e self-consciousness.' The c subtile element of sound' 
(s' abda-tanmdtra) ; the f subtile element of tangibility' (spars'a- 
tanmdtra) ; the ' subtile element of colour' (rupa-tanmdtra) ; the 
' subtile element of savour' (rasa-tanmdtra) ; and the s subtile 
element of odour' (gandha-tanmdtra) ; — these are the five c subtile 
elements/ 

[" Tan-mdtra is a compound of tad, c that/ and mdtra, ' alone ;' 
implying, that in which its own peculiar property resides, without 
any change or variety." In this respect the ' subtile elements' 
are held to differ from the gross or derivative elements, the pro- 



SANKHYA PHILOSOPHY. 11 

perties of which are various at different times and in respect to 
different mortals.] 

No. 20. — The ( subtile elements of sound' [like the ' atoms' 
of the Nyaya, which are separately inappreciable by the senses 
of men,] are apprehended only in [derivative and gross] ' sounds/ 
Varieties of ' sound' are apprehended, such as e acutely accented/ 
< gravely accented/ ' circumflexly accented/ and [the notes of 
the gamut — viz. :] 'C (shadja), ' D' {rishabha), e E' {gdndhdra) t 
'F' (madhyama — i. e., the 'middle' note of the scale — correspond- 
ing to the ' sub-dominant'*), ' G' (panchama — i.e. the 'fifth' note 
of the scale — corresponding to the i dominant'), e A' (dhaivata), 
' B' (nishdda), &c. But there is not hence [i. e., in accordance 
with the variety in sounds appreciable by mortals] any diversity 
in the e subtile element of sound' itself. 

* It is noticeable that the keynote and those two important notes, the do- 
minant and sub-dominant, have names marking their place in the scale, 
whilst the other names are unscientific and fantastical. The word rishabha 
means ' a bull,' gdndhdra means 'red lead,' dhaivata seems to have no sense 
elsewhere, and nishdda means 'an outcaste.' The keynote — viz., shad-ja 'born 
of six' is said to be so named because it is "supposed to require for its articu- 
lation the employment of the tongue, teeth, palate, nose, throat and teeth," — 
but this is evidently the conjecture of a grammarian, not of a musician. The 
writers on music may have given it the name as indicative of the acoustic 
fact that the ear, though content if the keynote be sounded, demands that, if 
the other six are sounded in their order, the keynote shall follow (before clo- 
sing) to complete the octave and to form the cadence. It is " the offspring of 
(all or any of these} six." 



12 A LECTURE ON THE 

No. 21. — The ' subtile elements of tangibility' are apprehen- 
ded only in [derivative cases — see No. 20 — ] of e tangibility.' 
In these, varieties of 6 tangibility' are apprehended — such as 
' soft,' * hard,' ' rough/ s slippery/ < cold/ 6 hot/ &c. But 
there is not hence any diversity in the e subtile element of tangi- 
bility' itself. 

No. 22. — The e subtile elements of colour' are apprehended 
only in ' colours/ In these, varieties of ' colour' are apprehen- 
ded — such as ' white/ f red/ c black/ c green/ ' yellow/ ' tur- 
meric-colour,' l madder-colour,' &c. But there is not hence any 
diversity in the e subtile element of colour 5 itself. 

No. 23. — The i subtile elements of savour' are apprehended 
only in ' savours.' In this, varieties of ' savour' are apprehen- 
ded — such as ' pungent/ 'bitter/ 'astringent/ 'alkaline/ 'sweet/ 
6 acid,' e salt/ &c. But there is not hence any diversity in the 
6 subtile element of savour' itself. 



SANKHYA PHILOSOPHY. 13 

No. 24. — The ' subtile elements of odour' are apprehended 
only in f odour. ; In this, two varieties of ( odour' — viz., ' fra- 
grance' and ' stench,' are apprehended. But there is not hence 
any diversity in the ' subtile element of odour' itself. 

Thus have the five ( subtile elements' been made known. 

^rthrt WT^rar^r i rr^T^TfV ^fasfrrTf% *T¥T*rmf% 

No. 25. — Now the synonymies of these are c elemental rudi- 
ments' (tan-mdtra) ; f unvaried' (avis'esha) ; the \ pervading ele- 
ments' or i whence the gross elements proceed' (mahd-bhiita) ; 
' producers' (prakriti) ; ' not adapted for [mortal] fruition' (a- 
bhogya) ; e atoms' ( anu) ; e not soothing' (as' ant a) ; mot terrific' 
(aghora) ; ' not stupifying' {amudhaj. [These last three names 
refer to the triad of Qualities — see No. 49]. Thus have the 
eight producers — viz., the 'undiscrete/ i intellect/ ' self-consious- 
ness,' and the five 'subtile elements/ been explained. 

Now why are these (No. 5) called 'producers' ? It is because 
they produce [the sixteen 'productions' — see No. 4 — which are 
next to be described.] 



14 



A LECTURE ON THE 



No. 26. — Now what are those sixteen ' productions ?' To this 
it is replied :— the eleven 'organs' (indriya), and the five [deri- 
vative or gross] < elements:'— these are the sixteen < productions, 
or e modifications' [vikdra]. 

fn **% «prtf^rrftr i 

No. 27. — Now the e organs' are set forth. The c organ of 
hearing' (s'rotra) ; the e organ of touch' (twach) and the 6 organ 
of sight' (chakshush) ; the c organ of taste' (jihwd) ; the ' organ 
of smell' {ghrdna) ; are the five ' organs of the intellect' {bud- 
dhindriya). 

(These are called ' organs of the intellect' because their func- 
tion is that of observation, not, as that of the other organs is, of 
action.) 

No. 28. — The c hearing' apprehends its' object ( sound' (s'ab - 
da). The e touch' apprehends its object ( tangibility' (spars'a). 
The e sight' apprehends its object e colour' (rupa). The 'taste' 
apprehends its object 'savour' (rasa). The 'smell' apprehends 
its object e odour' (gandha). 



SANKHYA PHILOSOPHY. 15 

No. 29. — The five e organs of action' (karmendriya), viz., the 
' voice' or the ' larynx &c.' (vdk), the ' hands/ the l feet/ the 
• organ of excretion,' and the c organ of generation/ perform 
severally their own function. The ' voice' pronounces words. 
The ' hands' perform actions. The e feet' perform locomotion ; 
the ( organ of excretion/ evacuation ; and the e organ of genera- 
tion/ enjoyment. c Mind' (manas), an organ both of observa- 
tion and action, performs its appropriate functions of 'resolving* 
(sankalpa) and ' doubting' (vikalpaj. 

Thus have the eleven organs been described. 

No. 30. — Now the synonymes of these are — 'organs of sense' 
(indriya); ' instruments' (karana) ; ' changers' (vaikdrika) ; e al- 
lotted' (to each mortal) (niyata) ; ' appliances' (pada) ; e placed 
under' (the soul) (avadhrita) ; ' subtile' (anu) ; 'organs' (aksha). 

No. 31. — Now what are the five 'gross elements' (mahd-bhu- 
ta)} To this it is replied — 'earth/ ■ water/ c light/ 'air/ and 
ether/ are the 'gross elements.' 

^rr: ^r^nft ir^THT^ ireTpTFnfSr ^gwf^^TT f 4f% i 



16 A LECTURE ON THE 

*r: I ^r^"^I%^tW^ tNt: I "ar^^i cfTfafW f^Tfft 3T- 

No. 32. — 'Earth/ acting in the character of supporter, co-ope- 
rates with the [ other] four [elements, in the production of ef- 
fects.' 'Water' acting in its character of the 'humid/ co-operates 
with the other four. * Light/ acting in the way of ' maturation,' 
co-operates with the other four. 'Air/ acting in the way of 
'siccation/ co-operates with the other four. ' Ether,' acting 
in the way of giving space, co-operates with the other four. 

' Earth' is possessed of five qualities — having ' sound,' ' tangibili- 
ty,' 'colour,' 'savour/ and 'odour.' 'Water/ possesses 'sound/ 'tan- 
gibility/ 'colour/ and 'savour/ 'Light' possesses 'sound,' 'tangibi- 
lity/ and ' colour.' ' Air' possesses ' sound' and 'tangibility.' 
' Ether' has the single quality of 'sound.' 

Thus have the ' gross' ' elements' been set forth. 

No. 33* — Now their synonymes — 'elements' (bhuta), 'varieties 
of element' (bhuta-vis'esha), ' productions' or ' modifications' 
(vikdra), 'forms' (dkriti), 'minute/ (tanu), bodies, ivigraha), 'soo- 
' thing/ ' terrific/ ' stupifying.' 

Thus have the sixteen ' productions' or 'modifications' been 
described. 



SANKHYA PHILOSOPHY. 17 

[ The eight ' producers/ and the sixteen 'productions,' or re- 
sults of the modification of the ' producers/ having been thus 
described, the third of Kapila's aphorisms, in which he announces 
' sou!/ is next adverted to.] 

*QQX% *5: *^T: I T^W^" I *^ff ITTf^: ^*T: W*l<T%- 

rr^r ^wt frof* j^sj *ftwT S^rkl ihrfa^^t nrc^- 

No. 34. — Now it is asked — what is ' soul' ? To this it is replied 
— 'soul' is without beginning, subtile, omnipresent, intelligent, 
without [the three] qualities [see No. 49], eternal, spectator, 
enjoyer, not an agent, the knower of body, pure, not producing 
aught. 



•O' 



No. 35. — Now it is asked — why [is it called] 'soul' (purusha)? 
Because it is ' ancient' (purdna) [having been from eternity — see 
No. 34 — ]; and because 'it reposes in body' (puri s'ayate) ; and 
because it is that towards which the ' highest affection' (puro hita) 
is entertained [ — seeing that each one loves self, if loving nought 
else — ] therefore it is called purusha, 

tot wmv^nfe : i sn^Tf^wr *r*4t ^t f%sn? t&pb» 

c 



18 A LECTURE ON THE 

A J 

No. 36. — Now why is it [f soul'] said to be ' without beginning' 
[No. 34] ? Because it has neither beginning, middle, nor end. 
Why e subtile' ? From its being without parts, and its transcen- 
ding the senses. Why 6 omnipresent' ? Because it comes into 
relation with all, and its sphere is boundless as the sky. Why 
e intelligent' ? From its discerning pleasure, pain, and delusion. 
Why c without qualities' ? Because neither the quality of e good- 
ness' [No. 49], of { passion,' nor of e darkness,' is in it. Why 
' eternal' ? From its not being made or produced. Why e specta- 
tor' ? Because it apprehends the modifications which productive 
nature undergoes. Why ' enjoyer' ? Because it discerns pleasure 
and pain through its possession of intelligence. Why e not an 
agent' ? From its being indifferent (uddsina) and devoid of the 
e qualities' [see No. 42.] Why the ' knower of body' ? Because 
through bodies it apprehends the c qualities.' Why ' pure' ? Be- 
cause in this ' soul' there are neither good actions nor bad. Why 
c not wont to produce' ? Because it is seedless : — that is to say, 
it does not give rise to any thing. 

Thus has the ' soul' of the Sdnkhya been described ? 

^[■sn^T yt^PSJ TOTCT: I p;S: 1 ^TWT I T5*TR^ l^^rw- 
si*ri#N: I %*rep 1 IT: I 3>fe: 1 sfff I ^T: I *T*r: \ 



SANKHYA PHILOSOPHY. 19 

*IZ\ faNft 5^ ^Tfa 5^SJK *TT^ ^H^: II 

No. 37. — Now the synonymes of this ' soul' — the 'reposer in 
body' (purusha) ; ' self (dtmci) ; ' the male' (puns) ; ' that which 
superadds the quality of reason to mere animal life' {yun-guna- 
jantu-jiva) ) the ' knower of body' (kshetra-jna); the c man' (rca- 
r«) ; the ' poet' {Jcavi) ; i deity' (brahma) ; the 'indestructible' 
akshara) ; c life' or ' vital air' (prcina) ; ' who/ 'who' ? ' he,' ' this/ 

Thus have the twenty-five ' principles' (tativa) been explained 
— viz :, the eight ' producers' [No. 5], the sixteen c productions' 
[No. 26], and 'soul' [No. 34] . 

" He who knows the twenty-five principles, whatever order of 
life he may have entered, and whether he wear matted hair, a 
top-knot only, or be shaven, he is liberated : — of this there is 
no doubt." 

^rq-re i "°*o*: f£ ^Tff ^rafiRf?r i ^f% ^mf inpsn 

No. 38. — Here it is asked — is 'soul' an agent, or not an agent ? 
If 'soul' were an agent, it would do only good actions — it would 
not adopt the c triad of habits.' 

[ What the three ' habits' are, is next stated.] 

No. 39. — The 'amiable' (sdtwika) habit consists of virtue. 



20 A LECTURE ON THE 

kindliness, restraint [of the senses], regulation [of the organs], 
freedom from enmity, correct judgment, the attainment of 
knowledge and supernatural power [see No. 13.] 

T17T: WV*\ %T*T: ^*rf^TT%T Sf^T^<TT SrjfefsiWra- 

No. 40. — But passion, anger, covetousness, the reproaching of 
others, extreme sternness, discontent, fierceness shown in change 
of aspect — this is called the e passionate' (rdjasa) habit. 

No. 41. — Madness, intoxication, lassitude, atheism, addic- 
tion to women, drowsiness, sloth, worthlessness, impurity — this 
is called the ' dark' (tdmasa) habit. 

t^: fVit vrfH i 

No. 42. — Since we see this triad cf habits in the world, the 
agency of the c qualities' [ in which these habits originate — see 
No. 49] is established ; and hence ' soul' [the agency being thus 
accounted for independently of it] is proved to be e not an agent.' 

No. 43.— Through 'passion' (No. 51) and ' darkness' (No. 



SANKHY.\ PHILOSOPHY. 21 

52), through an erroneous view, it (viz., ' soul') foolishly ima- 
gines — 'I am the agent' in regard to these ' qualities' (No. 49) 
which belong to nature. Though incompetent even to the crook- 
ing of a straw, ('soul' imagines) 'All this was made by me — 
this is mine :' — thus saying, it, through a vain imagination, fool- 
ish, insane, becomes as if it were an agent. 

*t: treats rraTwm^rrrfr ^ vigfk o 

No. 44. — On this subject it is said (in the Bhagavad Gitd — 
Lect. Ill v. 2~.) " Actions are effected by the qualities of nature, 
according to their shares : — the soul, deluded by the conceit of 
individuality, imagines ' I am the agent.' " 

(And again, Lect. XIII. v. 31.) 

" From its being without beginning, and its being devoid of the 
c qualities,' this incorruptible supreme Soul, even while remain- 
ing in body, neither acts nor is affected." 

Also— (Lect. XIII. v. 29). 

"Whoso beholds actions as in all respects performed by nature 
alone, and so too beholds Soul as a non-agent — he indeed sees 
(aright)." 



22 A LECTURE ON THE 

No. 45. — Here the question occurs — is f souP one, or many ? 
To this it is replied : — the multiplicity of ' sour is proved by the 
diversity of the conditions of pleasure, pain, delusion, mixture 
of race, purity of race, soundness of organs, birth, and death, and 
by the difference of the world (heaven, earth, and hell,) and of of- 
fice, and of caste. If there were only one e soul,' then, when one is 
happy, all would be happy ; when one is grieved, all would be 
grieved ; when one is deluded, all would be deluded ; when one 
is of mixed race, all would be of mixed race ; when one is of pure 
race, all would be of pure race; when one possesses soundness of 
organs, all would possess soundness of organs ; when one is born, 
all would be born ; when one dies, all would die. Hence 'soul' 
is not one ; and hence multifarious l souls' are proved to exist — 
for these possess a multiplicity of distinctive characters in the 
diversified allotment of form, birth, habitation, fortune, society, 

and body. 

p. 

No. 46.— -Thus [as set forth in No. 45] do the teachers of the 



•VKHYA PHILOSOPHY. 23 

Sdnkhya, Kapila, Asuri, Panchas'ikha, Patanjali, &c . describe 
souls as many. The teachers who speak according to the Veddnta 
[the doctrine derived from the Vedas,~] viz., Harihara, Hiranya- 
garbha, Vyasa, &c, describe Soul as one only. 

No. 47. — Why thus (but one)? He replies. This [universe] is 
Soul only. [Soul is] all that has been, and that is to be, and the 
lord of immortality — that which by nought else is overlaid. It alone 
is fire, it is the sun, it is air, and it is the moon. It alone is pure, 
it is the vast one, it is the waters, it is the lord of creatures, it 
alone is the true nectar of immortality, it is liberation, it is the ul- 
timate goal, it is the indestructible, it is the glory of the sun, it 
is that beyond which there is nothing else, than which there is 
nothing either more recent or more ancient. 

■era f% vwirWi %% %% ^ferT: I **Wr ^STST ^3" T?$- 



24 A LECTURE ON THE 



No. 48. — Firm as a tree it remains in the heavens. With that 
Soul all this is filled everywhere. On all sides are the hands, 
feet, eyes, heads, and faces of that [Soul-tree] — and, with ears 
in all directions, it stands embracing all — assuming the aspect of 
all the organs and qualities, though devoid of all the qualities — 
the lord and ruler of all — the great refuge of all — that which al- 
together is all the principles, is every soul, is the source of all — 
into which all is resolved — the sages regard it as Brahma. For 
only one soul is located in various bodies ; as the Moon, though 
but one, appears many in [many vessels of] water. In ail exis- 
tences, immoveable or locomotive, it dwells — one only — by which 
all this [universe] was spread out. This soul, of all worlds, is 
but one : — by ivhom is it made more ? Some speak of soul 
as several — seeing that Knowledge and other mental states are ob- 
servable [simultaneously — some being happy while others are sad]; 
but in the Brahman, the worm, and the insect ; in the outcaste, 
the dog, and the elephant; in goats, cows, gadflies, and gnats, 
the wise behold the same [single Soul]. Just as a thread may 
pass through golden beads, and again in like manner through 
pearls, gems, coral, earthen beads, or silver, — so this Soul is to be 



SANKHYA PHILOSOPHY. 25 

regarded as remaining everywhere one — in caws, men, elephants, 
deer, &c. 

No. 49. — Now it is asked— what is the ' triad of qualities' ? It 
is replied — the triad of qualities consists of ' Goodness' (sattiva), 
'Foulness' (?°ajas), and 'Darkness' (tamas). By the 'triad of 
qualities' is meant the 'three qualities/ 

No. 50. — ■>' Goodness' (sattwa) is endlessly diversified, accor- 
dingly as it is exemplified in calmness, lightness, complacency, at- 
tainment of wishes, kindliness, contentment, patience, joy, and 
the like. Summarily, it consists of happiness. 

No. 51. — 'Foulness' (rajas) is endlessly diversified, according- 
ly as it is exemplified in grief, distress, separation, excitement, 
anxiety, fault-finding, and the like. Summarily, it consists of 
pain. 

No. 52.—' Darkness' (tamas) is endlessly diversified, accordingly 
as it it is exemplified in envelopement, ignorance, disgust, abject- 
ness, heaviness, sloth, drowsiness, intoxication, and the like. 



58 A LECTURE ON THE 

Summarily, it consists of delusion. 

No. 53.— So far ( i. e. in Nos. 50, 51, and 52,) has the e triad 
of qualities' been expounded. 

One should regard c goodness' as e illuminating ;' one should 
regard c foulness' as \ exciting' ; one should regard e darkness' 
as ' non-illuminating' ; — such is what is named the ( triad of qua- 
lities.' 

«\ 
No. 54.— The next question is— what is ( meant by) 'developement* 
and 'resolution' (sanchara and pratisanchara — the 5th and 6th in 
Kapila's enumeration of topics — No. 6) ? To this it is replied — 
'development' is production: — c reabsorption' [pratisanchara) 
is dissolution. [ The order of ] ( production' is as follows ; — 
from the e undiscrete' beforementioned [No. 7L superintended by 
Soul, which is another [ than Nature, and for whose use is the 
assemblage of sensible objects,] and omnipresent, 'intellect' is 



B^NKHYA philosophy. 27 

produced. ' Intellect 1 is of eight kinds — [No. 9]. From the prin- 
ciple of ' intellect' ' self-consciousness' [No. 17] is produced. 
1 Self-consciousness' is of three kinds [No. 18] — the ' modifying,' 
the ' active,' ' ardent,' or ' urgent,' and the ' origin of the ele- 
ments.' From the ' modifying self-consciousness' the gods and the 
senses are produced; from [self-consciousness as] 'the origin of 
the elements' the ' subtile elements' (No. 19) are produced. 
From the ' active' both proceed, [for, without the 'active,' both 
the others are held to be inert]. From the x subtile elements 
[are produced] the [gross] * elements :' — such is [ the order 
of] 'development.' 

i sfN^T siwrcr: i 

No. 55. — f Reabsorption' [No. 6] is as follows : — the ' ele- 
ments' are resolved into the ' subtile elements ;' the ' subtile ele- 
ments' and the 'senses' into 'self-consciousness ;' ' self-conscious- 
ness' into 'intellect;' 'intellect' into the ' undiscrete.' The 
• undiscrete' is nowhere dissolved. Why? Because it was not 
produced out of anything (into which it might be resolvable). 
Regard Nature and Soul as being both eternal. Thus has ' reab- 
sorption' been explained. 



28 A LECTURE ON THE 

CI 9S. 



No. 56. — Now it is asked — what is meant by the * ministers 
of soul' [No 6], the ' province of an organ/ and the 'presiding 
deity ?' To this it is replied : — ' intellect' is a ' minister of soul ;' 
'whatever is to be understood' constitutes its ' province;' and its 
'presiding deity' is Brahma. ' Self-consciousness' is a ' minister 
of soul ;' whatever is ' to be believed' constitutes its ' province ;' 
and Rudra is its 'presiding deity.' 'Mind' is a 'minister of soul;' 
whatever is ' to be resolved on' constitutes its 'province;' the 
Moon is its ' presiding deity.' The ' hearing' is a ' minister of 
soul;' whatever is ' to be heard' constitutes its ' province;' the 
Ether is its ' supernatural presiding power.' The ' touch' is a 
' minister of soul ;' whatever is ' to be touched' constitutes its 
'province;' the air is its ' supernatural presiding power.' The 
'sight' is a ' minister of soul ;' whatever is ' to be seen" consti- 
tutes its ' province ;' the sun is its ' presiding deity.' The 



SANKHYA PHILOSOPHY. 29 

' taste' is a ' minister of soul ;' whatever is ' to be tasted' con- 
stitutes its ' province ;' Varuna [the god of the waters] is its 
' presiding deity.' The 'smell' is a ' minister of soul ;' what- 
ever is 'to be smelled' constitutes its ' province;' the Earth is 
its 'supernatural presiding power.' The ' voice' is a ' minister of 
soul ;' whatever is ' to be uttered' constitutes its ' province ;' its 
'presiding deity' is either Saraswati or Fire. The 'hands' are 
' ministers of soul ;' whatever is ' to be grasped' constitutes their 
' province;' Indra is their ' presiding deity'. The feet are ' mi- 
nisters of soul ;' whatever is e to be gone over' constitutes their 
'province;' Vishnu is their 'presiding deity.' The e organ of 
excretion' is a ' minister of soul;' whatever is ' to be excreted' 
constitutes its 'province;' Mitra is its 'presiding deity'. The 
\ organ of generation' is a ' minister of soul ;' what is ' to be en- 
joyed' constitutes its 'province;' Prajapati is its 'presiding 
deity.' 

Such, in the case of each of the thirteen kinds of instruments 
[ of the soul], is the respective 'minister,' ' province,' and 'presi- 
ding deity'. 

?r Thrift %T ^^Rt wre* i gw^TMf^W^ i f%^- 

II Tf?T rpr^T^: II 

No. 57. — Whosoever is correctly acquainted with the 'princi- 
ples' [viz. the 8 ' producers', 16 'productions,' and 'soul'], the 
nature of the 'qualities,' and the ' presiding deities' [ No. 56], 
being liberated from his sins and released from the whole of his 
defects, enjoys [the various pleasing effects of] the ' qualities,' 
(while he remains in the world) and is liberated from the 'quali- 
ties' (when he attains to final emancipation). 



30 A LECTURE ON THE 

So much for the discussion of the [25] ' principles' (tattwa) . 

urt *rff fipn 1 ^nrrf^ra<OTf%fiRsrT wf^mirt *n fin- 

No. 58. — Now what are those five ' intelligent functions' ( No. 
6) ? To this it is replied : — f ascertainment' (adhyavasdya), 'con- 
ceit' (abhimdna), e willing' (ichchhd), e adaptability' (karttavyatd), 
and e action' (kriyd). The function of intellect when it decides 
* This is to be done by me/ is e ascertainment' {adhyavasdya). 
That function of the intellect, self-consciousness, — the notion that 
' I act' — which fixes on the conceptions of e self and * not-self — is 
' conceit'. The intelligent function of ' mind 5 is ' willing' — desiring 
and purposing. The intelligent function of the organs of sense 
(No. 27) is the e adaptability' of each sense, such as the hearing, or 
the like, to its object, such as sound, or the like. The intelligent 
function of those (organs of action — No. 29 — ) which are recog- 
nised by e utterance,' and the like, is called c action'. 

Thus have the five c intelligent functions' been explained. 

^T2T ^T^T: ^ wmHTrt" t<3^ i tRt: ^t wr 



SANKHYA PHILOSOPHY. 31 

No. 59. — Now, what are those five c sources of action' (No. 6) ? 
To this it is replied : — c firmness/ or ' decision of character' 
(dhritij, 'faith' (s'raddhd), ' piety' (sakhd), i indifference about 
knowledge' (avividishd), and ' desire of knowledge' (vividishd) : 
— these are the five ' sources of action.' 

Having resolved on any outward act, he who keeps his pur- 
pose, being intent on it, and carrying it into effect, — this [con- 
duct of such a man] furnishes the definition of 'firmness/ 

The characters by which c faith' may be recognised are stated 
to be the perusal of the Scriptures, the condition of the religious 
6tudent, sacrificing or causing sacrifices, penance, giving and re- 
ceiving proper donations, and making oblations. 

But he who may addict himself to study, to religious actions, 
and austerities, being always intent on penances with a view to the 



32 A LECTURE ON THE 

obtaining of future enjoyments, — this [conduct of such a one] is 
called e piety.' 

' Indifference about knowledge' implies that the heart is engros- 
sed with the sweets of sensual objects. 

c Desire of knowledge' is the source of the wisdom of the wise. 

The unity (of Nature), the severalty (of Nature and Soul), 
the eternity [of Soul ] and its unconsciousness, the subtilty [of 
Nature], the existence of effect [in its cause — even antecedently 
to manifestation — as the statue exists in the block of marble — ] 
and the duration (of body even after the attainment of knowledge — 
see No. 69) — this is to be considered (as constituting the assem- 
blage of matters which form the object of) f the desire of (true) 
knowledge'. 

^t^t ^tt m^ t<^?? ^m: w% *reft* ^ftwt i w? 

No. 60. — It is now asked — what are the five * airs' (No. 6) ? 
To this it is replied : — the five airs, in the bodies of those who 
have bodies, are those named prdna, apdna, samdna, uddna, and 
vydna. The ' air' called prdna is that which is superintended by 
the mouth and nose. It is so named because it comprises ' inspi- 
ration' {pranayana) and « expiration' (prakramana) . [This refers to 



SANKHYA PHILOSOPHY. 33 

the process of respiration]. The 'air' called apdna is that which 
is superintended by the navel. It is so called from its ' taking 
away' (apanayana), and e going downwards'. [This refers to 
flatulence]. The 'air' called samdna is superintended by the 
heart. It is so called from its i leading and going equably* 
[neither up nor down — as far as regards the food, to aid in the 
digestion of which is its province]. The 'air' called udlna is that 
which is superintended by the throat. It is so named from its 
ascending and ' going upwards' (ut/cramana). [This refers to the 
arterial pulsation Sfc. of the upper members of the body — the throat 
and head]. The f air' called vydna is the f pervader' (vydpaka) 
of the whole body. [This refers to pulsation in general and all 
the other involuntary actions of the system.] 

Thus have the five ' airs' been described. 

^Tcrr: i 

No. 61. — It is now asked — what are those five 4 whose nature is 
action' (No. (3) ? To this it is replied: — the c modifying' (vaikdri- 
ka), the 'ardent' (taijasa), the < origin of the elements' (bhutddi), 
that which is 'associated with inference* (sdnumdna), and that which 
is ' not associated with inference' {nlranumdna). Among these 
the i modifying' [form of c self-consciousness' — see No. 18 — ] is 
the agent in good actions :— the ' ardent' is the agent in actions 
not good:— the 'origin of the elements' is the producer of things 
good but obscure : — [self-consciousness] ' associated with inference' 
is the worker of what is good but foolish : — and that which is f not 



34 A LECTURE ON THE 

associated with inference' is the worker of what is not good and 
(also) foolish. 

Thus have the five been explained, ' whose nature is action,' 

No. 62.— Here it is asked — what is that i ignorance' — under 
five divisions [No. 6] ? To this it is replied : — s obscurity' (tamas}, 
{ illusion' (moha), e extreme illusion' (mahdmoha), 'gloom' (td- 
misra), and c utter darkness' (andha-tdmisra). . Among these, 
e obscurity' and f illusion' are each eightfold. 'Extreme illusion' 
is tenfold. ( Gloom' and ' utter darkness' are eighteenfold. 

' Obscurity' is the conceit that [he will be liberated from trans- 



Ba'NKHYA PHILOSOPHY. 35 

migration because] soul [merges] into [some one or other of] the 
eight c producers,' which are not Soul — viz., those called the 
* undiscrete, 5 e intellect,' ' self-consciousness,' and the five 'subtile 
' elements/ — [the errors in regard to these eight severally making 
up the eight varieties of e obscurity']. * Illusion' is the conceit (of 
liberation) which arises from the possession of the eight kinds of 
superhuman power, such as ' minuteness' and the rest (No. 13). 
' Extreme illusion' is when one supposes i I am liberated' through 
(any one of) the ten modes (supplied by) the objects of sense, viz., 
sounds, &c, belonging to the seen and to the unseen (or scripture- 
revealed) world — (i. e. the five as perceived by men and the five as 
perceived by the gods). e Gloom' is that unchecked hate (or 
fierce impatience) in regard to the (possession of the) eight kinds of 
superhuman power, i minuteness,' &c, and the ten kinds of objects 
of sense, which (by preventing liberation) results in the three 
kinds of pain (incident to corporeal existence.) i Utter darkness' 
is the name given to that grief which arises at the time of death, 
when one is in possession of (anyone of) the eight kinds of super- 
human power, or of the ten kinds of objects of sense. 

Thus has fivefold ' ignorance' (the obstruction to the soul's 
object of final liberation) in its sixty-two varieties, been declared. 



8$ A LECTURE ON THE 

No. 63. —It is now asked— what is twenty-eightfold ' disability' 
(No. 6) ? To this it is replied :— the depravity of the eleven 
organs, and the seventeen injuries of the intellect — these constitute 
twenty-eightfold 'disability.' Now the defects of the organs 
are stated : — in the organ of hearing, deafness ; in the organ of 
taste, insensibility ; in the organ of touch, leprosy ; in the organ 
of sight, blindness ; in the organ of smell, loss of smell ; in the 
organ of utterance, dumbness; in the hands, crippledness; in the 
feet, lameness ; in the organ of excretion, constipation ; in the 
organ of generation, impotence ; in the mind, insanity: — such are 
the defects of the eleven organs. The seventeen ' injuries of the 
intellect' are the reverse of (the nine kinds ol) 'acquiescence' and 
of (the eight kinds of) 'perfectness.' What is meant by the 
* reverse of acquiescence' is next stated. 

No. 64. — Among these [that 'are the f reverse of acquiescence' 
- — No. 66 — ] that called anantd is the belief that there is no such 
thing as Nature. In like manner, (non-acquiescence) in the 
notion that Soul consists of Intellect, is that called tdmasa-lind. 
So, again— the non-recognition of c self-consciousness' is that 
called avedyd. (The notion that) there are no ' subtile elements/ 



SANKHYA PHILOSOPHY. 37 

the causes of the gross elements, is that called avrishti. The 
concerning one's self about the acquisition of the objects of sense 
is that (form of non-acquiescence) called asuldra ; and (the con- 
cerning one's seif) about their preservation is that called asu- 
pdra. The concerning one's self about property, without regard- 
ing the evils of waste, is that called asiuietra. The addiction 
to enjoyment is that called asumarichikd. The engaging in enjoy- 
ment, on the part of one who docs not look to the evils arising 
from injury (to created beings), is that called anuttamdmbhasikd. 

Thus have the ninefold opposites of acquiescence been explained. 
[The technical names here are the opposites of those adverted 
to in section Xo. 66.] 






38 A LECTURE ON THE 

No. 65. — Now (as regards) the ' opposites' of perfectness. 
These are called also the eight e imperfections' (asiddhi). When 
the diversity (of the various principles from which the creation 
proceeds) appears as the unity of the mere (phenomenal) creation 
— this (imperfect view of the truth) is called atdra. After hearing 
the words merely (of a competent instructor), the adoption of the 
contrary is that called asutdra : — as when, having heard that * he 
who acknowledges the various principles is liberated/ one deter- 
mines that it is the reverse — viz., that ' he who acknowledges the 
various principles is not liberated.' When a person, even though 
intent on studying and hearing, through obtuseness or from his 
intellect's being impaired by unsound doctrine^ does not attain to 
a perfect knowledge of the twenty-five principles, then his ignorance 
is called atdratdra. To another, who, though oppressed by the 
pain inseparable from body and mind, yet, from feeling no anxiety 
about transmigration, entertains no curiosity, knowledge is no 
' delight' (pramoda) . Analogously are the next two to be regarded 
— viz., (the forms of 6 imperfection' termed — as the opposites of 
the corresponding two forms of i perfectness' in No. 67 — ) apra- 
mudita and apramodamdna. Ignorance that arises from the not 
arriving at certain knowledge even on being instructed by a friend, 
is that called arasya. When, from his preceptor's disregarding 
him, or not instructing him correctly, an unfortunate man does 
not attain to knowledge, his ignorance is called asatpramudita. 

Thus have those c opposites of perfectness,' the eight imperfec- 
tions, been explained. [The technical names are the opposites of 
those adverted to in section No. 67-] 

Thus have the twenty-eight kinds of ' disability' [No. 63] been 
explained. 



SANKHYA PHILOSOPHY. 39 

^ft^^ *ftg^r TTW^si *w?r rT^r g"?3T ^t mfcr- 

wit *?&; wq\xm^ i ^t-^t s*nf t ^t ^re^Ti^re": irsr- 
^fireta^ i ^75fr raW m^i H^$*nfm* ^ *j ^ : ir^f^rrr- 

No. 66. — Now it is asked — what is ninefold ' acquiescence* 
[No. 6] ? To this it is replied : — having supposed that Nature is 
Soul, a man contentedly betakes himself to indifference: — the 



40 A LECTURE ON THE 

technical [or slang] name of his indifference is ambhas, [the ordi- 
nary sense of which word is ' water']. Another, having satisfied 
himself that 'intellect' is Soul, is contented. The technical 
name of his ' acquiescence' is salila ' water.' Another, having 
come to the conclusion that ' self-consciousness' is Soul, is con- 
tented. The technical name of his ' acquiescence' is ogha ' quan- 
tity.' Another, having decided that the 'subtile elements/ 
those called the ' unfitted for [mortal] fruition' [No. 25] are Soul, 
is contented. The technical name of his 'acquiescence' is wish- 
ti ' rain.' Such are the four ' internal' or ' spiritual' (adhydtmika) 
kinds of 'acquiescence.' Where [together or separately] those four 
kinds of acquiescence exist, liberation -does not take place — from 
the inconsistency [of such sentiments] with a knowledge of the 
principles. 

The five 'external' (vdhya) kinds of 'acquiescence' consist "in 
abstaining from [the enjoyment of the five] objects of sense, 
[such abstinence proceeding] from observation of the evils of 
acquiring, preserving, waste, attachment [to sensual pleasures], 
and injuriousness. A man is acquiescent (and abstinent) from 
observation' of the evils attendant on the acquiring of property; 
but his liberation — even though he be an ascetic — does not take 
place, because of the (quite possibly concurrent, and here as- 
sumed,) absence of a knowledge of the principles. This fifth kind 
of 'acquiescence' is (technically) named sutdra. Another is 
acquiescent from observation of the evils attendant on the preser- 
ving of property; but his liberation — even though he be an 
ascetic— in the absence of a knowledge of the principles, does 
not take place. This sixth kind .of ' acquiescence' is (technically) 
named supdrd. Another is acquiescent from observation of the 
evils of the waste of property ; but his liberation — even though 
he be an ascetic — in the absence of a knowledge of the principles, 



SANKHYA PHILOSOPHY. 



41 



does not take place. This seventh kind of : acquiescence' is 
(technically) named sunetra (' a beautiful eye'). Another is 
acquiescent from observation of the evils attendant on attachment 
(to sensual pleasures)— but his liberation — even though he be an 
ascetic — in the absence of a knowledge of the principles, does 
not take place. This eighth kind of i acquiescence' is (techni- 
cally) named sumarichikd. Another is acquiescent, and abstains 
from worldly acts, from observation of the evils in the shape of 
injury, &c, to created beings on account of property — but his 
liberation — even though he be an ascetic — in the absence of a 
knowledge of the principles, does not take place. This ninth kind 
of c acquiescence' is (technically) named anuttamd ('best'), or 
sdtwiki ( f amiable'). 

Thus have these nine kinds of acquiescence been explained. 

t CN j 



^T^Ft3<w?i" rn^T^TTTY^ ^^ fe^' *^<%fir$&' 



42 A LECTURE ON THE 

^ I iTTq^STT^T^f ^Tn$*T^?f rlT^T^*^ ^ft^Tf^T^KT 
arr^TTfTT: I 

No. 67. — Now it is asked — what are the eight kinds of ( per- 
fectness' (No. 6)? To this it is replied: — the knowledge which 
arises from reasoning, in regard to the principles (No. 57), the 
conditions of intellect (No. 9), and the elemental creation (No. 
72) — this, the first kind of e perfectness,' is (technically) named 
tdra. The knowledge, in regard to the principles, the conditions 
of intellect, and the elemental creation, which arises from hearing 
alone — this second kind of e perfectness' is (technically) named 
sutdra. The knowledge, in regard to the principles, the con- 
ditions of intellect, and elemental creation, which arises from 
study, — this third kind of c perfectness' is (technically) named 
tdrayanti. The knowledge, in regard to the principles, the 
conditions of intellect, and the elemental creation, which 
arises on effecting the removal of internal pain, — this fourth 
kind of { perfectness' is (technically) named pramoda ( ' de- 
light'). The knowledge, in regard to the principles, the 
conditions of intellect, -and the elemental creation, which arises 
on effecting the removal of external pain — this fifth kind of e per- 
fectness' is (technically) named pramodita ( e delighted'). The 
knowledge, in regard to the principles, the conditions of intellect, 
and the elemental creation, which arises on effecting the removal 
of pain occasioned by something superhuman — this sixth kind of 
e perfectness' is (technically) named pramodamdna. The know- 
ledge, in regard to the principles, the conditions of intellect, 
and the elemental creation, which arises from continuance of 
association with amiable persons, — this seventh kind of c perfect- 
ness' is (technically) named ramyakd. The knowledge, in regard 



SANKHYA PHILOSOPHY. 43 

to the principles, the conditions of intellect, and the elemental 
creation, when a teacher is propitiated by giving him veneration, 
— this eighth kind of ' perfectness' is (technically) named satpra- 
mudita. 
Thus have these eight kinds of ' perfectness' been explained. 

Wc3 ^T^^csr^TrfTT^ tT^T fa^T^T Tf^T: TOfa: fW^- 

.No. 68. — Now it is asked — what are the ten ' radical facts' 
(No. 6) ? To this it is replied — the existence (of ' Soul' and 
of ' Nature') ; the singleness (of Nature); its objectiveness ; its 
subservience ; the distinctness (of Soul from Nature) ; and the 
inertness ( of Soul) ; the union (of Soul and Nature) ; the separa- 
tion (of Soul from its corporeal frame) ; the peculiar habit of 
body — its durability (after it ought to have disappeared). 

Such are the ten i radical facts.' 

v^ii^ ^it^ttV ^^psn^' crsrr ir^T^^rr^fa §t*t: f%^g: i 
^Tf*rf% tr^r^^r* f*rg* i ^HRcrf^fa f%ihref%: fan i 



44 A LECTURE ON THE 

No. 69. — ' Since the assemblage of sensible objects is for an- 
other's use/ the existence of Soul is established. The existence 
of Nature is established by the pair in order — (of antecedent and 
consequent) — viz., that ' since specific objects are finite/ therefore 
' there is a general cause which is undiscrete'. Since 'what is 
causable is inconstant (and multitudinous), &c./ the singleness (of 
Nature which is not caused by aught) is established. Since 
* these (meaning the Qualities) consist in pleasure, pain, and dul- 
ness, &c./ (see the Xllth of the Memorial Verses of the San- 
khya — ) the objectiveness (of Nature) is established. Since 'by 
manifold means (Nature, without benefit to herself, accomplishes 
the wish of Soul,)' the subserviency (of Nature) is established. 
Since ' it (the ' undiscrete/ as well as its modifications) has the 
three qualities, is indiscriminative, objective, &c./ the distinctness 
(of Soul, which is, in all these respects, the reverse,) is establish- 
ed. ' From the contrast' (shown to exist between active 
Nature and Soul) the inertness (of Soul) is established. , ' For the 
Soul's contemplation of nature, and for its abstraction, &c.' — thus 
is the union (of the two) established. Since ' separation (of the 
Soul) from the body takes place, when the object is accomplished/ 
the separation of the two is established. Since 'of birth, death, 
and the instruments of life, (the allotment is severally diverse)/ 
the multiplicity of Soul is established. Since it is 'like the whirl- 
ing of the potter's wheel, (after the impulse that set it in 
motion has been discontinued)/ the peculiar habit (of body, 
which continues, till death, to invest the soul even of him who 
has attained to perfect knowledge,) is established. 

Thus have the ten ' radical facts' been explained. 



B^NKHYA PHILOSOPHY. 45 

No. 70. — The fifty intellectual modifications consisting of the 
seventeen (enumerated in Nos. 64 and 65) and of those (thirty 
three) previously exhibited (in Nos. 62 and 63), together with 
these (ten ' radical facts' — No. 69 — ) make up the sixty topics 
called the ' System of Sixty.' 

^Tre %T I^TT^ W: I "^^^ 1 scrWTTt T^rTWTW^- 

No. 71. — Now it is asked — what is e benevolent creation' (No. 
6) ? To this it is replied : — ' benevolent, creation' consists in the 
production of external objects from the five ' subtile elements.' 
(As it is said) ( Brahma, perceiving these (senses, &c.) produced 
from thought ( — see No. 19) to be destitute of a sphere of action, 
created, from these 'subtile elements,' this ( benevolent creation.' 

*rr: 1 T^Tf^ JTSWrTT: TTf^W: I wf^ ^ZTnTT: *ft- 
^T: 1 TrfrsrnrTTf^ ^TFrlT: W^T: I Tfa fk*i$1- 



46 



A LECTURE ON THE 



No. 72. — Now it is asked — what is the fourteenfold ' elemen- 
tal creation' (No. 6) ? To this it is replied :— the divine kind is 
of eight sorts— that of hobgoblins, of titans, of attendants on the 
god of riches, of celestial quiristers, of demigods, of divine 
sages, of the planetary regents, and of the supreme deities. Such 
are the eight families of divinities. The grovelling kind is five- 
fold — that of domestic animals, winged animals, wild animals, 
reptiles, and, lastly, of fixed things. Mankind is single in its 
class — beginning with the Brahman, and ending with the Chandala. 
Domestic animals, beginning with the cow, end with the mouse. 
Wild animals, beginning with the lion, end with the jackal. 
Winged animals, beginning with the bird of Vishnu (or the adju- 
tant), end with the gnat. Reptiles, beginning with the World- 
snake, end with the worm. Fixed things, beginning with the tree 
of Paradise, end with grass. Thus is the grovelling kind five- 
fold. Compendiously, this (elemental) creation is threefold — 
(viz., — divine, human, and grovelling — and, thus viewed, it sup- 
plies the 21st topic in Kapila's enumeration — see No. 6.) All 
this constitutes what is called the mundane orb. 



SANKHYA PHILOSOPHY. 4/ 

No. 73. — Now it is asked — what is threefold ' bondage' (No. 
6) ? To this it is replied : — the bondage of the ' producers/ that 
of the 'modifications,' and that of 'ritual observance.' And first 
of the 'bondage of the producers :' — this is the name given to the 
'absorption into nature' (No. 15.) of him who imagines that (any 
of) the eight 'producers' constitute Soul. The 'bondage of the 
modifications' is the name given to that (which opposes the libe- 
ration) of those wordly devotees who are in the power of the 
1 modifications' of nature (No. 26), such as the senses — who are 
devoted to objects of sense, such as sounds, &c, — -who have not 
their organs in subjection — who are ignorant, and deluded by 
passion. The ' bondage of ritual' is the name given to that 
(which opposes the liberation) of those who, whether household- 
ers, students, mendicants, or anchorets, with minds vitiated by 
passion and delusion, bestow (on Brahmans, upon solemn or 
sacrificial occasions,) gifts prompted by conceit. 

Thus has threefold ' bondage' been explained. And it is said — 
" Bondage is spoken of by the title of ' bondage through nature' — 
1 bondage through nature's modifications' — and, thirdly, as that 
1 through gifts.' " 



48 A LECTURE ON THE 

No. 74.— Here it is asked — -what is threefold 'liberation' (No, 
6) ? — It is (1) from the increase of knowledge, (2) from the sub- 
duing of the senses and passions, and (3) from the destruction of 
the whole. From the increase of knowledge and the subduing of the 
senses and passions, there results the destruction both of merit and 
demerit, and, from the destruction of merit and demerit, (liberation 
in the shape of) f singleness* (kaivalya). And it is said — (i The 
first liberation is (gained) by knowledge ; the second, from the 
destruction of passion ; and the third, from the destruction of 
ail : — such are the characters of liberation." 

fit? fafw n*fTwf%w3r?r 1 ^^in^^^^f<T i ^?r- 
f%rfN WW I 

No. 75.— What is threefold ' Proof (No. 6) ? To this it is 
replied : — ' perception,' e inference,' and ' right affirmation' — this 
is threefold ' proof.' 

^ wi \ 

No. 76. — f Perception' (drishta) is now described. Whenever 
the five objects of the senses are present to the senses, there is 
' perception.' 

No. 77. — The proof called ' inference' is knowledge arising on 



SANKHYA PHILOSOPHY. 49 

the recognition of a ' sign' [linga). For example — by the rising of 
clouds (regarded as a sign of approaching rain) rain is proved (to 
be approaching) : — by cranes and the like (regarded as a sign 
attendant on the sheets of water which they frequent) water (is 
proved to be in the neighbourhood of the place where the cranes 
are seen). By smoke (regarded as a sign of fire) fire (is proved 
to exist where the smoke originates) : — this is the third kind of 
inference. 



v.* 



No. 78. — A fact which is not established by ' perception' 
or by ' inference,' is established (when it is established) by ' right 
affirmation'. Such matters (not proveable either by percep- 
tion or by inference) are (the existence of) Indra the king of the 
gods, the northern Kurus, the golden mountain Meru 3 the 
nymphs in Paradise. These — Indra, &c, — not proveable either 
by perception or by inference, the sages, such as Vas'ishta de- 
clare — saying (i Indra &c. do exist/' There is also the Scripture 
( — which is an authority sufficient to establish such points). 

" He who is assiduous in his own duties, devoid of passion and 
malice, intelligent, and virtuous — such a one is to be held 'wor- 
thy' (to be received as an authority in regard to matters not de- 
monstrable by perception or by inference)." 

Thus has ' threefold proof' been declared. 



50 A LECTURE ON THE 

Cs 

No. 79. — Now it is asked — what is established by this * three- 
fold proof ? To this it is replied : — As^ in common life, things are 
estimated by means of a measure — grain and the like by means 
of such (measures of capacity) as nprastha, and sandal &c. by 
means of weights — so by means of this (apparatus of 'perception/ 
' inference,' and c right affirmation'), the ' principles/ the e modifi- 
cations of intellect/ and the e elemental creation/ [ — see No. 67 — ] 
are accurately determined [ pramiyante — whence the^r name of 
pramdna l proof.'] 

No. 80. — u Oppressed by ' threefold pain/ the Brahman had 
recourse to the great sage Kapila" — [see No. 5] — so the ques- 
tion arises — what is 'threefold pain' ? To this it is replied — e natu- 
ral and inseparable' (ddhydtmika) ; ' natural and extrinsic* (ddhi- 
bhautika) ; and * non-natural or superhuman' (ddhidaivikaj. 



SANKHYA PHILOSOPHY. 51 

No. 81. — Pain f natural and inseparable' [No. 80] is of two 
kinds, corporeal and mental. ' Corporeal* means residing in the 
body; 'mental' means residing in the mind. Pain, arising from 
disorder of the wind, bile, or phlegm, and taking the form of 
fever, flux, cholera, swooning, Sfc, is called e corporeal'. Desire, 
anger, covetousness, folly, madness, envy, &c, — privation of 
what is liked and approximation of what is disliked — this is 
called ' mental' [pain or evil.] 

[The pain called ddhydtmika is that which arises from the 
things called adhydtma — see No. 56]. 

No. 82. — What arises from an object of sense (adhibuta — see 
No. 56) — is called ddhibhautika ( f natural and extrinsic'). Pain 
is l natural and extrinsic' which arises from men, cattle, wild 
beasts, reptiles, or things that do not move. 

No. 83. — What arises from a supernatural agent {adhidaiva— 
see No. 56) — is called ddhidaivika (' non-natural' or i superhu- 
man'). Of this description is pain which arises from cold, heat, 
wind, rain, thunderbolts, and the like. 

No. 84. — [As stated at the outset — in the mind] of the Brah- 
man, oppressed by the three kinds of pain, there arose c a desire to 



52 A LECTURE ON THE 

know' — such is the meaning of the word jijndsd (the desiderative 
noun from jnd 'to know'), just as pipdsd (from pa ' to drink') 
means the desire of a thirsty man to drink water. 

: *tajpr^r i xfH at n^n^iwfmw^w^ ^m i tot- 
T^ II 

No. 85. — This is saving knowledge (derived) from the com- 
pendium (of principles laid down by kapila.) Having known this, 
there will be no further transmigration. Such is the doctrine of 
the magnanimous great sage Kapila. 

It is to be observed that there are in this treatise (as much as, 
three hundred couplets of the Anushthubh metre. 

Thus concludes the comment on the aphorisms called * The 
Compendium of Principles/ 

86. — Of the name Sdnkhya, which the philosophical system of 
Kapila bears, two explanations are given. According to the 
one explanation, the system is so named, from the word sankhyd 
c number,' — " because it observes precision of reckoning in the enu- 
meration of its principles." As the word sankhyd also signifies Ci de- 
liberation or judgment," the name was more probably intended to 
designate the result of the e< deliberate judgment" of Kapila on 
the great problem of the universe — with a special regard to eman- 
cipation from the evil that prevails in the world. 

87. — The twenty-five ' principles' (tattwa) of the system, it 
will be observed, are comprised in the first three aphorisms (No. 
6.) — viz., the c eight producers,' the ( sixteen productions,' and 
( Soul.' These twenty-five principles, according to the Sankhya, 
constitute " all that is ;" and Kapila, we have seen, promises 



SANKHYA PHILOSOPHY. 53 

the enquirer that his final liberation from all distress will be the 
result of understandine: "the real nature of all that is." A no- 
ticeable distinction between Kapila's way of speaking of things, 
and that of the Naiyayikas, presents itself in their respective 
choice of a fundamental verb. The language of the Nyaya is 
moulded on the verb " to be,' 1 and that of the Sankhya on the 
verb " to make." The Nyaya asks " what is . ? " — the Sankhya 
asks " what makes it so ?" The one presents us with a iC compte 
rendu" of the Universe as it stands : — the other presents as with 
a cosmogony. As the one subdivides its subject-matter into the 
two exhaustive categories of Existence and Non-existence, the 
other exhibits everything (except ' Soul' — the spectator of the 
phantasmagoria) under the two aspects of c producer' and ' pro- 
duction.' 

The f productions' are held to be not other than the 'produ- 
cers' modified; and the producers — all except the first of them — 
are but modifications of the first — the mula-prakriti. By what 
process of thought the notion of such a first principle is arrived 
at, the following extract from Morell's History of Philosophy 
(Vol. I. p. 208), may serve to illustrate. Mr. Morell is there 
speaking of one of the latest German systems, that of Herbart. 

88. — ff The process by which the necessity of philosophy comes 
w to be felt is the following : — When we look round us upon the 
" world in which we live, our knowledge commences by a per- 
" ception of the various objects that present themselves on every 
" hand to our view. What we immediately perceive, however, is 
< c not actual essence, but phenomena; and after a short time, we 
" discover that many of those phenomena are unreal ; that they 
" do not portray to us the actual truth of things as they are ; 
" and that if we followed them implicitly, we should soon be 
" landed in the midst of error and contradiction. For example, 



54 A LECTURE ON THE 

" what we are immediately conscious of in coming into contact 
iC with the external world, are such appearances as green, blue, 
" bitter, sour, extension, resistance, &c. These phenomena, 
i( upon reflection, we discover not to be so many real indepen- 
i( dent existences, but properties inhering in certain substances, 
" which we term things. Again, when we examine further into 
" these substances, we discover that they are not real ultimate 
" essences, but that they consist of certain elements, by the 
" combination of which they are produced. What we term the 
" reality, therefore, is not the thing as a ivhole, but the elements 
cc of which it is composed. Thus the further we analyse, the 
" further does the idea of reality recede backwards ; but still it 
" must always be somewhere, otherwise we should be perceiving a 
(i nonentity. The last result of the analysis is the conception 
6i of an absolutely simple element, which lies at the basis of all 
(i phenomena in the material world, and which we view as the 
" essence that assumes the different properties which come be- 
*- fore us in sensation." 

89.— This " essence that assumes the different properties which 
come before us in sensation,". — this, which the European analyst 
arrives at as " the last result of the analysis" — is what the San- 
khya expositor, proceeding synthetically, lays down as his first 
position. This primordial essence — among the synonymes for 
which, given in our text-book (No. 7), are the e undiscrete/ the 
< indestructible,' that ' in which all generated effect is compre- 
hended,' Sfc, is the c Absolute' of German speculation. The 
developement of this principle, according to one of Schelling's 
views (noticed by Mr. Morell at p. 147 vol. 2d) is " not the free 
and designed operation of intelligence, but rather a blind impulse 
working, first unconsciously in nature, and only coming to self- 
consciousness in mind." So, according to kapila, "from Na- 
ture issues Mind, and thence Self-consciousness" [see No. 54] : 



SANKHYA PHILOSOPHY. 55 

— but here a striking difference between the European and the 
Oriental theory presents itself — for the Self-consciousness, which 
so many European philosophers assume as the only certain start- 
ing-point, and as the very characteristic of Soul, is declared by 
Kapila to be no property of Soul, and to be regarded as such 
only through a delusion. In the 64th of the 'memorial verses' of 
IV war a Krishna, as translated by Mr. Colebrooke, Kapila 
says : — 

90. — " So, through study of principles, the conclusive, in con - 
(t trovertible, one only knowledge is attained, that neither i am, 
" nor is aught mine, nor do I exist. 5 ' 

91. — This statement M. Cousin not unnaturally regards as 
amounting to "le nihilisme absolu, dernier fruit du scepticisme" 
— but Professor Wilson, in accordance with the commentaries, 
declares that " It is merely intended as a negation of the soul's 
" having any active participation, any individual interest or pro- 
" perty, in human pains, possessions, or feelings." The Soul, 
according to the Sankhya, might be described in the terms in 
which Fichte speaks of the Mind, "as it were, an intelligent eye, 
f: placed in the central point of our inward consciousness, sur- 
veying all that takes place there" — (Morell — Vol. 2. p. 95). In 
the words of Kapila (Verse 19th), " Soul is witness, solitary, 
" bystander, spectator, and passive." Soul being thus inert, all 
that is done arises from the energy of the c radical principle' — of 
which one might correctly speak in the terms employed by 
Schelling in speaking of the 'Absolute,' where he says — "The 
u primary form of the Absolute is ivill, or self-action. It is an 
u absolute power of becoming in reality what it is in the germ." 
(Morell— Vol. 2. p. 150). 

92. — The 'Absolute,' the germ, in the hands of Kapila, hav- 
ing reached the form of c Self-consciousness' — ahaixkdra — the 



56 A LECTURE ON THE 

t making of an If — the ( positing of an 'Ego' — the course of sub- 
sequent developement runs parallel, for some distance, with that 
followed by Fichte, who takes the l Ego 1 as his starting point. 
According to a writer in Brande's Dictionary — " To use the 
" language of Fichte — the ego is absolute, and posits itself: it is 
" a pure activity. As its activity, however, has certain indefin- 
li able limits, when it experiences this limitation of its activity, 
" it also posits a non-ego, and so originates the objective world. 
" The ego, therefore, cannot posit itself without at the same 
" time projecting a non-ego ; which, consequently, is in so far 
(i the mere creation of the ego." In like manner the ahankdra 
of Kapila creates [No. 54] out of itself the five ' subtile ele- 
ments,' the bases of the gross elements, — so that the world of 
sense, formed out of these, is, in this as in Fichte's system, " the 
mere creation of the ego." A marked difference between the 
two systems, as observed before, consists in this — that Kapila 
makes the creative l Ego' to be something else than ' Soul,' which 
latter, he holds, by confounding itself with the active principle,, 
gets entangled in the distresses of life. 

93. — The motive of the Brahman's enquiry at Kapila, it will 
be remembered, is this — that he wishes he may not be " again 
" obnoxious to the three sorts of pain :" — in other words that he 
may not be born again— that he may be no more liable to trans- 
migration or the Metempsychosis. Of the Metempsychosis 
Prof. Wilson (Sdnkhya Kdrikd p. x.) says : — " This belief is not 
" to be looked upon as a mere popular superstition; it is the main 
"principle of all Hindu metaphysics; it is the foundation of all 
" Hindu philosophy." The doctrine of the Metempsychosis may 
be regarded as the Hindu theory on the great question of the 
" origin of evil." The theory may be thus stated. Evil ex- 
ists — and it is not to be supposed that evil befals any one 



SANKHVA PHILOSOPHY. 57 

undeservedly. When, therefore, for example, a newborn child, 
who has had no opportunity of acting either rightly or wrongly, 
is found suffering evil, it is inferred that the evil is the fruit of 
evil deeds done in a former state of existence. If it be asked how 
the person became disposed to do evil in that former state of 
existence, the answer offered is this — it was the consequence of 
evil deeds done in a state of existence still anterior — and so on. 
Applying now the principle of c limits' — that what is true at every 
assignable point short of the limit, must be true at the limit — 
as there is no assignable point in the existence of evil in past 
time for its existence at which point this hypothesis does not 
serve equally well to account, it is argued that, on this hypo- 
thesis, and on no other, is the existence of evil fully accounted 
for. To the European this method of accounting for the origin 
of evil appears to be vitiated by the c regressus in infinitum' (ana- 
vasthd) — the same consideration which vitiates the theory of the 
earth's resting on the elephant, the elephant's resting on the 
tortoise, and so on without end. The origin of evil he regards as 
not having been revealed ; and the requirement that we shall 
maintain our reliance on the goodness of God in the absence of 
such revelation, he regards as a trial of our faith. 

94. — Several of the terms in the treatise of which a translation 
has been given, do not occur in the Sankhya treatises generally 
studied. On these and some other points a few annotations here 
follow. 

95. — Among the epithets applied to e Self-consciousness' (in 
No. 18) are sdnumdna and niranumdna. We can get no account 
anywhere of this application of these terms. Self-consciousness 
'not associated with inference' might possibly refer to the 
simple consciousness of existence j whilst the consciousness 
1 associated with inference' might refer to the notion of the Egoist 

II 



58 A LECTURE ON THE 

who has reasoned himself into the belief that he himself consti- 
tutes all that is — (see No. 17) : — but then the difficulty would 
remain of tracing the connexion between this sense and the func- 
tions assigned to these aspects of self- consciousness under No. 
61.— The technical or 6 slang' terms in Nos. 64 &c, differ in our 
text-book from those given in the comment on the Kdrikds — see 
p. 155 of the Sdnkhya Kdrikd, where Prof. Wilson says " No ex- 
planation of the words is anywhere given, nor is any reason 
assigned for their adoption." 

96.— On the ' triad of qualities' (No. 49), Prof. Wilson, at p. 
52 of the Sdnkhya Kdrikd, remarks : — " In speaking of qualities, 
ei however, the term guna is not to be regarded as an insubstantial 
tc or accidental attribute, but as a substance discernible by soul 
'" through the medium of the faculties. It is, in fact, nature, or 
" prakriti, in one of its three constituent parts or conditions, 
" unduly prominent ; nature entire, or unmodified, being nothing 
" more than the three qualities in equipoise, according to the 
6C Sutra, ' Prakriti is the equal state of goodness, foulness, and 
6( darkness.' " 

97.— The term ahhihuddhi would seen to be obsolete in the 
sense assigned to it in No. 58. In the copy of the work em- 
ployed in making the translation, the same term (abhibuddhi) is 
repeated as representing the first of its own five subdivisions. 
This, with other obvious clerical errors, has been amended with 
the concurrence of learned pandits. The term karttavyatd, in 
the same passage, is akin to our term c susceptibility.' 

98. — { Inference' is briefly noticed in paragraph No. 77 '. As 
the writers on the Sankhya do not appear to be all exactly of the 
same mind on the subject of inference, it may be worth while to 
examine the matter : — and, as the terms which they make use of 
are the same as those which are employed, with less diversity of 



SANKHYA PHILOSOPHY. 59 

sentiment, by the Naiyayikas, it may be as well to begin by de- 
termining the sense in which the Naiyayikas understand the 
terms. 

99. — After describing e perception/ in his fourth aphorism, 
Gautama, the founder of the Nyaya school, proceeds, in his fifth 
aphorism, to speak of f inference* as follows : — 

^ m i 

"Now ( inference, 1 preceded thereby [i. e., preceded by c per- 
ception'] is of three kinds — (1) that which has the ' prior' — (2) 
that which has the ' posterior' — and (3) that which is [or consists 
in] the perception of c community.' " 

100. — c Inference/ as stated in paragraph No. 77 of our text- 
book, is " knowledge arising from the perception of a ' sign ;' " 
and as the ' sign' (linga) — the Greek ar^no-j or rather xexpypm 
— the " mark from which a conclusion may be drawn'' — may be 
of three kinds ; so the modes of ' inference,' as stated in the apho- 
rism of Gautama, are likewise three. 

101. — The first kind of 'sign' Gautama calls e prior' fpurvva). 
The meaning of the term is explained by his commentator (in 
the Xijihja-sutra-vritti) as follows : — 

^^ I 

u [By the expression in the aphorism] ' prior' [is meant] cause 
—[a cause being prior to, or the antecedent of, its effect — and, 
when perceived, serving as a 'sign' of the effect yet unperceived]. 
[By the expression in the aphorism] ' which has that' [i. e., which 
has the fc prior,' or cause— is meant] which has that as a ( sign*. 



60 A LECTURE ON THE 

As (for example) the inference of rain from the circumstance of 
the gathering of clouds." 

In this example of inference, the c prior' (purvva) — the antece- 
dent or cause — is the ( sign ;' — the gathering of clouds, the ante- 
cedent or cause of rain, being that e sign' from which a fall of 
rain is inferred by anticipation. By European writers, this 
kind of inference is named, in terms strictly corresponding to 
those of the Nyaya, inference e a priori' [i. e. the inference of the 
consequent from the antecedent], 

102. — The second kind of ' sign 5 Gautama calls c posterior' 
(s'esha). The meaning of the term is explained by his commenta- 
tor as follows : — 

c ' [By the expression in the aphorism] c posterior' [is meant] 
effect [ — an effect being posterior to, or the consequent of, its 
cause — and, when perceived, serving as a ' sign 5 of the cause 
which was unperceived]. [By the expression in the aphorism] 
e which has the posterior' [is meant — inference] which has that 
['posterior' or consequent] as a c sign.' As [for example] the in- 
ference of rain from the swelling of a river". 

In this example of inference, the 'posterior' {s'esha) — the con- 
sequent or effect — is the 'sign' ; — the swelling of a river — the con- 
sequent or effect of rain — being the 'sign' from which a fall of 
rain is inferred to have gone before. By European writers, 
this kind of inference is named, in terms strictly corresponding 
to those of the Nyaya, the inference ' a posteriori' [i. e., the in- 
ference of the antecedent from the consequent^, 

103. — The third kind of ' sign' Gautama calles 'the perception 

of community' (sdmdnyato drishta). The import of the term is 

explained by his commentator as follows :— - 



SAN'KHYA PHILOSOPHY. Gl 

'* [By inference from] ' the perception of community' [is meant 
inference] where the ' sign' is other than effect or cause. As [for 
example] the inferring that something is a substance from its ha- 
ving the nature of earth 1 '. 

In this example the sdmdnya or 6 generic character' termed 
prithivitiva ' earthiness' is a ' sign' from which, when perceived, 
€ substantiality' — neither the cause nor the effect, but, in this in- 
stance, the higher genus — is inferred. The definition applies also 
to 'inference from analogy', as the term samanyato drishta has been 
rendered. 

104. — The commentator from whom we have quoted mentions 
another opinion in regard to the names of the three kinds of 
inference ; — that they refer to those three kinds of e signs' (specifi- 
ed in page 38 of the e Lectures on the Nyaya Philosophy' — ) 
viz., the c sign' which is in every case present ; that which 
is absent in every case but one ; and that which is present in 
some cases and absent in others. This notion — apparently origi- 
nating in nothing much deeper than the consideration that there 
are " three to three'' — may be dismissed as barely on a level with 
Captain Fluellen's parallel between Harry of Monmouth and 
Alexander of Macedon, (in e King Henry V — Act iv — sc. 7-), 
based on the consideration that " There is a river in Macedon ; 
and there is also moreover a river at Monmouth'\ 

105. — Of the three examples given in our text-book (No. 77) 
the first— viz : the inferring of ' rain from the assembling of clouds,' 
falls under the first division (—see No. 101.). The second 
example— the inferring that ' there is water because there are 
cranes &c.', exemplifies the second division— (sec No. 102) —the 



62 A LECTURE ON THE 

presence of the cranes and such-like waterfowl being consequent 
on the presence of the water which these birds frequent. The 
third example — the inferring of c fire from smoke' — (which the 
author of the Sdnkhya Pravachana Bhdshya refers to the first 
class) — falls under the same head as the second — smoke being 
met with only where there has been fire as an antecedent. The 
selection of examples here therefore is unsatisfactory — being at 
once redundant and defective. 

106. — In the 5th and 6th of the < Memorial Verses', inference 
is spoken of as follows : — 



-f^f%^3*m*n*3iT?f 



Thus rendered by Mr. Colebrooke — 
" Inference, which is of three sorts, premises an argument, 
and (deduces) that which is argued by it." * * * * "it is by 
inference (or reasoning) that acquaintance with things transcend- 
ing the senses is obtained :"— . 

[Professor Wilson prefers rendering the latter clause thus : — 
" It is by reasoning from analogy that belief in things beyond the 
senses is attained."] 

107. — The remarks of the scholiast Gaudapada (in the Sdn- 
khya Bhdshya) on the foregoing text are as follows :— 

■strong i wum *nj^nN «ranrcf *RPirarrera ire 



SANKHYA PHILOSOPHY. G3 

cTT^fafr fT3TT ^faqmST^RT^rsr ^fWrTT^T Tfa W[- 
?fT^KT ^^^ ^TTV^frr I 1OTWT«rp^^ 11 f^ rffW f%" 

(i Inference, which is of three kinds, takes the name of * that 
which has the consequent' (see No. 99), ( that which has the 
antecedent,' and ' that which is [or consists in] the perception of 
Community.' ' That which has the antecedent,' is that [form of in- 
ference] where [it is argued] — 'That [which we are adducing as the 
sign] is the antecedent of this [which we wish to establish] :' — 
as, for example, when one proves [an approaching fall of] rain by 
the rising of clouds — because this [rising of clouds] is an antece- 
dent of rain. [As an example of inference] l which has the con- 
sequent' — [suppose that] having found a drop of water taken from 
the sea to be salt, the saltness of the rest also is inferred. c Ana- 
logous' — as, having observed their change of place, it is conclud- 
ed that the moon and stars are locomotive like Chaitra : that is, 
having seen a person named Chaitra transfer his position from one 
place to another, and thence having known thathewas locomotive, 
it is inferred that the moon and stars also are locomotive. So too, 
observing a mango tree in blossom, one establishes the fact that 
other mango trees also are in flower [not by adducing, in proof of 
the fact either, the cause of the fact or any consequence of the fact 
— but] by remarking the common nature [of the mango tree under 
inspection — in virtue of which common nature the other mango 



64 A LECTURE ON THE 

trees blossom simultaneously with it.] Such is [inference by 
means of] i the perception of Community.' 

Again [the words] tailing 'gapurvvakam &c, [may be rendered 
otherwise : — thus] tad l that' — viz., ' inference' — UnggapurvvaJca 
' where, from a characteristic, that which possesses the character- 
istic is inferred/ as, [one is inferred to be] a mendicant from his staff 
[when his staff is of the characteristic description carried by mendi- 
cants]. And [the act of inference may be said to be] linggipurvva- 
ka, c where, from what possesses a characteristic, the character- 
istic itself is inferred/ as, having seen a mendicant, you say, this 
[which he holds in his hand, and which, from distance or some 
other reason, is not clearly discernible in his grasp] is his triple 
staff — [for where the mendicant presents himself, there his cha- 
racteristic staff is sure to be found also]." 

Now, in his example of inferring the saltness of the ocean from 
the saltness of a drop taken from it, Gaudapada appears to have 
been misled by the ambiguity of the word s'esha, which the Nai- 
yayikas employ as the opposite of pur vv a — the opposition intend- 
ed being that of antecedent, and consequent not that of part and 
remainder. Gaudapada, taking the word in its familiar sense of 
6 the rest,' imagines that when we infer the rest of the ocean to be 
salt like a drop taken from it, the process falls under the second 
head in the division of the modes of inference, whereas it falls under 
the third head — the same which he exemplifies by the case of the man- 
go-trees. As we infer that other mango-trees blossom when one 
mango-tree blossoms, because all mango-trees have one common 
nature ; so likewise do we infer that the other drops of the ocean 
are salt, when we find that one drop is salt, because all the drops 
in the ocean have one common nature. Thus, whilst our anony- 
mous commentator on Kapila gives two examples of the second 
kind and no example of the third, Gaudapada gives two exam- 
ples of the third kind and none of the second. For the illustra- 



SANKHYA PHILOSOPHY. 65 

ticn of Kapila, therefore, some of his commentators would ap- 
pear, by these discrepancies, to have borrowed the terminology of 
the Nyaya without considering themselves bound to adhere to 
the sense assigned to the terms by the inventors. Whether the 
writers on the Sankhya, as has been suggested, intended, by their 
peculiar application of the terms of the Nyaya, to inculcate their 
own tenet of the indifference of cause and effect) is a point the 
consideration of which we remit to another occasion. 



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